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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to assess the level of competition prevailing in the Spanish banking 
system. The current analysis employs a widely used non-structural methodology put forward 
by Panzar and Rosse (1987) —the so-called H-statistic— and draws upon a comprehensive 
panel dataset of Spanish commercial and savings banks covering the period 1986-2005. 
Standard estimates characterize a hump-shaped profile for the H-statistic throughout the 
time span under consideration. Nevertheless, a weighted procedure is subsequently 
performed in order to control for firm size and the number of branches. The estimation 
outcome reveals a gradual rising path for the H-statistic, thus suggesting a more competitive 
environment among larger banks. In both settings, a noteworthy increase in the degree of 
competition is identified at the turn of the eighties, when several liberalization-oriented policy 
measures came into force. The aforementioned findings discredit the widespread hypothesis 
which states that concentration impairs competition. 
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1 Introduction 
Competition has become a recurrent topic in the banking literature. Specifically, during the 
last decade a great deal of empirical work has attempted to measure the level of competition 
prevailing in European banking markets. The beginning of the third stage of the Economic 
and Monetary Union, in January 1999, and the projected changeover to the euro triggered 
the interest of researchers in this issue. The initial purpose was to explore the impact of 
European policy actions aimed to create a level-playing-field in the provision of financial 
services. The transformation of the European Union's financial landscape was expected 
to unleash competitive forces in the banking industry, boost the scope of desintermediation 
and securitisation, foster cross-border capital flows and prompt the restructuring and 
consolidation processes. 
Another stimulus which made researchers draw attention on this issue stems 
from industrial organization (IO) theory. In particular, the conventional view which holds that 
increasing concentration may lead to undesirable exercise of market power, i.e. that 
concentration impairs competition, has been subject to an enormous amount of controversy. 
The IO theory on competition is usually divided into two major streams, namely the structural 
and non-structural approaches1. The former embraces the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis (EH). 
The SCP, originally due to Bain (1951), investigates whether high levels of market 
concentration result in collusive behavior and other non-competitive practices among larger 
firms. The simplest procedure to test the SCP paradigm consists in regressing a measure of 
the firms' profitability on a proxy for market concentration. A positive coefficient is expected to 
arise in order to validate this hypothesis as it would imply that higher concentration goes hand 
in hand with higher market power. 
On the other hand, the EH, which stems from Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977), 
states that efficient firms increase in size and, therefore, in market share due to their ability to 
generate higher profits, leading to higher market concentration. Under the EH there is no 
direct relationship between competition and concentration, and a highly concentrated sector 
is the logical outcome of market forces. 
The banking literature has now advanced well past this simple approaches. In 
reaction to the theoretical and empirical shortcomings attributed to the structural stream, 
namely the recognition of the need to endogenize market structure, three non-structural 
models of competitive behavior have been developed within the emerging New Empirical 
Industrial Organization (NEIO) framework. These models, which measure competition and 
emphasize the analysis of the competitive conduct of firms without using explicit information 
about the structure of the market, belong to Iwata (1974), Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), 
and Panzar and Rosse (1987). These models have an important feature in common, they 
measure competition by estimating deviation from competitive pricing. 
The Iwata model consists in the estimation of conjectural variation values 
for individual firms supplying an homogeneous product in an oligopolistic market. 
                                                                          
1. Interested readers should refer to Bikker (2004). 
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The Bresnahan-Lau model comes down to the estimation of a simultaneous equation system 
where a parameter representing the degree of market power of firms is included. Both the 
Iwata and the Bresnahan-Lau models have scarcely been applied for empirical purposes. 
For instance, the Iwata measure has only been applied once to banking by Shaffer and 
DiSalvo (1994). Their main drawback relies on their data-intensiveness. 
By contrast, the third approach has received widespread acceptance by the 
academic community. The Panzar-Rosse model builds a competition indicator, the so-called 
H-statistic, which provides a quantitative assessment of the competitive nature of a market. 
The H-statistic is calculated from reduced-form revenue equations and measures the 
elasticity of total revenues with respect to changes in factor input prices. Panzar and Rosse 
showed that, under certain assumptions, the comparative static properties of this type of 
equations provide a proxy for the overall level of competition prevailing in the market. 
Last, but not least, other reasons underlying the awakening of competition analyses 
in banking economics have to do with the safety and soundness of financial systems, as an 
adequate degree of competition and concentration is supposed to safeguard financial 
stability. Indeed, it has become a matter of prime interest among central bank regulators and 
supervisors, who are in need of devices for monitoring the evolution of banking competition. 
Despite the great number of investigations devoted to the topic, it should be 
underlined that evidence is still rather mixed. The bulk of empirical studies report the 
existence of monopolistic competition for every single country under consideration (including 
Spain), albeit to varying degrees. In this context, the main purpose of this article is to 
contribute to the ongoing debate over this issue and to cast some light on the Spanish case 
by means of the Panzar-Rosse approach. 
The current paper draws upon a comprehensive bank-level dataset of Spanish 
depositary institutions covering an extensive twenty-year-long period (from 1986 to 2005). 
Two different econometric techniques are performed in order to exploit both the 
cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the panel data, and, thus, ensure a robust 
assessment of the overall level of competition prevailing in the Spanish banking industry. 
Standard estimates reveal a hump-shaped profile for the H-statistic, within the upper 
monopolistic competition range. Subsequently, the analysis is sharpened with a weighted 
procedure which accounts for differences in firm size and the number of branches. 
A reinforced level of increasing competition is the main finding within this setting. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses several 
views on the production process of banking firms in order to set the stage for the theoretical 
framework of the Panzar-Rosse approach, which is described in Section 3. A brief survey of 
the literature on this particular methodology is presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides 
an overview of the dataset. The empirical model employed in the analysis is presented in 
Section 6. Afterwards, estimation results are reported in Section 7. The final section offers 
a brief summary and outlines some competition policy implications. 
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2 A Primer in the Theory of Banks' Activities 
Before entering the analysis of the methodology put forward by Panzar and Rosse it is worth 
devoting a couple of pages to review the different approaches of banks' activities which have 
been developed within the industrial organization framework. Indeed, several assumptions 
about banks' production activities have to be made in order to transfer the NEIO approaches 
from classical industries to banking sectors, since the latter are only to a limited extent 
comparable to other kind of firms. 
Even though several attempts have intended to model the role played by banks as 
economic and production units of the economy, the lack of agreement concerning the 
appropriate delineation of output and inputs for banking firms has a long history and still 
remains as a controversial issue that plagues all bank studies. Briefly, the vast literature 
carried out in this field may be divided, according to Colwell and Davis (1992), into two 
separate branches: the production approach (PA) and the intermediation approach (IA). Both 
approaches apply the classical microeconomic theory of the firm, but differ in the specification 
of banks' activities. 
The PA, set forth by Benston (1965) and Bell and Murphy (1968), posits that banks 
are devoted to the production of services to depositors and borrowers using labor and 
physical capital as factor inputs. This approach explicitly recognizes the multiproduct nature 
of banking firms. 
A challenging point of view comes from the IA, as it holds that deposits and loans 
have different characteristics. While the former are presented as divisible, liquid, short-term 
and riskless assets, the latter are described as being indivisible, illiquid, long-term and risky. 
Besides, the total amount of loans granted by a certain bank may not equal the total amount 
of deposits collected, as it can adjust its surplus or deficit of funds at the interbank market. 
For these reasons, and in order to highlight the transformation activity carried out by banks, 
the IA posits that banks produce loans using labor, physical capital and financial capital 
(deposits plus funds borrowed in the financial markets) as inputs. 
Several tests addressing whether deposits are best characterized as outputs or 
inputs have been posed. For instance, Hancock (1991) provides an interesting study based 
on the 'user cost methodology'. This author regresses banks' profits on the real balances of 
banks' balance sheet items2. Those balance sheet items exhibiting positive coefficients are 
asummed to correspond to outputs, whereas variables reporting negative coefficients 
are associated with inputs. Hancock's inquiry reveals that both loans and deposits deserve 
the consideration of outputs. Thus, her findings are in line with the production approach. 
Nonetheless, Hughes and Mester (1993) developed another test consisting in 
the estimation of a variable cost function with fixed levels of deposits. They find that the 
derivatives of this function are negative, which they interpret to mean that deposits 
are inputs, as an increase in the level of one input, ceteris paribus, ought to be linked to 
a reduction in the amount of money spent on other inputs. In a more recent study, 
                                                                          
2. It should be noted, as in Freixas and Rochet (1997), that contrary to non-financial firms, whose input and output data 
are obtained from their profit and loss accounts, the input and output volumes of banks are obtained from their balance 
sheet statements. 
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Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) extend this analysis and draw the conclusion that 
uninsured and insured deposits alike are to be categorized as inputs3. Therefore, their results 
are consistent with the intermediation approach. 
Noteworthingly, a previous study by Sealey and Lindley (1977) offers a reconcilable 
view of both approaches. These authors, who were among the first to model the technical 
and economic features of banks' production functions, consider deposits as an intermediate 
output, supplied by means of several services offered to depositors, and later used in the 
issuance of loans. Thus, a remarkable feature of banking institutions stems from the fact 
that a substantial part of their costs relates with the provision of services as partial payment 
for an input (loanable funds). The cost of 'attracting' this input comprises implicit resource 
costs, i.e. labor, capital and material inputs involved in this activity. 
As a result of the preceeding analysis, the production process of the banking firm is 
amenable to suit the stylized scheme presented in Figure I. The multistage production 
process comprehends three basic inputs —labor, financial capital and physical capital— and 
one intermediate output —deposits— which also exhibits the characteristics of an input as it 
is deployed to produce the final output —loans—. 
 
Figure I.  The multistage production process of the banking firm 
according to Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
LABOR
FINANCIAL CAPITAL
PHYSICAL CAPITAL
BASIC INPUTS
DEPOSITS
LOANS
OUTPUT
INTERMEDIATE 
OUTPUT
FINAL 
OUTPUT
INPUTS  
 
It is worth emphasizing that only the 'intermediate' view related above is consistent 
with both the empirical evidence and the neoclassical theory of the firm underlying the 
Panzar-Rosse methodology. As the following subsection will review, it was originally designed 
for quantifying the level of competition in homogenous single-output industries. 
                                                                          
3. This view is additionally supported by the rising importance of interbank deposits which certainly do not meet the 
characteristics of final outputs [Hempell (2002)]. 
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3 Theoretical Framework of The Panzar-Rosse Approach 
John C. Panzar and James N. Rosse (P-R hereinafter) developed an empirical test 
to discriminate between oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive 
markets. Their procedure, which is based on the comparative static properties of 
reduced-form revenue equations, accomplishes a concise indicator, the so-called H-statistic. 
Under certain restrictive assumptions, it can be interpreted as a continuous and increasing 
measure of the overall level of competition prevailing in a particular market. 
The methodology put forward by Panzar and Rosse (1987) stems from a general 
equilibrium market model. It relies heavily on the premise that firms will employ different 
pricing strategies in response to changes in factor input prices depending on the competitive 
behavior of market participants. In other words, competition is measured by the extent to 
which changes in input prices are reflected in firms' equilibrium revenues4. 
Following Bikker and Haaf (2002), let’s consider a representative bank i. The twofold 
profit optimization condition applies at the industry and firm levels. At the former level, the 
zero profit constraint must hold5: 
( ) ( )CiiiiRiii ZWyCZyR ,,, ** =  (1) 
where ( )iR ⋅  and ( )⋅iC  refer to the revenue and cost functions of bank i, iy is the output of 
the firm, iW is a K-dimensional vector of factor input prices of bank i, ( )Kiii w,...,wW 1= , RiZ  is 
a vector of J exogenous variables affecting the revenue function ( )RJiRiRi z,...,zZ 1=  and CiZ is a 
vector of L exogenous variables that shift the cost function ( )CLiCiCi z,...,zZ 1= . 
At the individual level, marginal revenues must equal marginal costs: 
( ) ( )CiiiiRiii ZWyCZyR ,,, *'*' =  (2) 
The measure of competition formulated by P-R, the H-statistic, evaluates the 
elasticity of total revenues with respect to changes in factor input prices: 
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4. By the way, Panzar and Rosse developed this methodology in 1977 during the course of an empirical study of 
the American daily newspaper industry. Ever since, their methodology has been applied to several sectors ranging from 
banking systems to airline industries. 
5. Variables marked with an asterisk represent equilibrium values. 
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The empirical application of the P-R approach usually assumes log-linearity in the 
specifications of the marginal revenue and cost functions6: 
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For a profit-maximizing bank the equilibrium output results from (2): 
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Rearranging terms: 
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The reduced-form equation for revenues of the representative bank is given by the 
product of the equilibrium output of bank i and the common price level: 
( ) ( )*** ii ypLnRLn =  (8) 
The price level is provided by the inverse demand equation, which also reads in 
logarithms: 
( ) )(YLnpLn λµ +=  (9) 
where 
∑
=
=
I
i
iyY
1                   (10) 
is the aggregate output of the industry. 
After a bit of algebra, the reduced-form revenue equation is achieved: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑
==
++=
Q
q
qiq
K
k
kiki zLnwLnRLn
11
* δβα
 (11) 
where iZ  is a vector of Q bank-specific variables, without explicit reference to their origin 
from the cost or revenue functions7, ( )Qiii z,...,zZ 1= . 
                                                                          
6. Ln denotes the natural logarithm. For estimation purposes, the log-specification is intended to avoid 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Hence, the H-statistic is calculated as follows: 
∑
=
=
K
k
kH
1
β
 (12) 
The H-statistic abridges in a single figure the overall level of competition prevailing in 
the market under consideration. According to P-R, the H-statistic ranges from minus infinity 
to unity (Figure II). A negative H arises when the competitive structure is a monopoly or a 
perfect colluding oligopoly. In both cases, an increase in input prices will translate into higher 
marginal costs, a reduction of equilibrium output and, subsequently, a fall in total revenues8. 
If H lies between zero and unity, the market structure is characterized by monopolistic 
competition. Under perfect competition the H-statistic equals to unity. In this particular 
situation, a proportional increase in factor input prices induces an equiproportional change in 
revenues without distorting the optimal output of any individual firm. 
Contestable markets would also generate an H-statistic equal to unity. The 
contestability theory, first stated by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), enables the existence 
of competition in highly concentrated scenarios9 under very restrictive circumstances, 
basically free entry and exit of market participants, i.e. neither economic nor legal 
entry barriers, completely costless exit, and highly price-elastic demands for industry's output. 
On account of these features, the threat of potential new market participants forces larger 
firms to price their output in a competitive manner. 
Figure II. Interpretation of the H-statistic 
1
0
H
…Monopoly equilibrium
Perfect colluding oligopoly
Monopolistic competition
Perfect competition
Oligopoly in a contestable market
…
 
Since P-R is a static approach, a critical feature of the empirical implementation is 
that the test must be undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium. In previous 
studies, testing for long-run equilibrium involves the computation of the H-statistic in 
a reduced-form equation of profitability, using a measure such as ROE or ROA in place of 
revenues as dependent variable. The resulting H is supposed to be significantly equal 
to zero in equilibrium, and significantly negative in case of disequilibrium. This empirical test 
has traditionally been justified on the grounds that competitive markets will equalize 
                                                                                                                                                 
7. In practice, both functions are affected by a common set of variables. It is hard to make a distinction between them. 
8. One limitation of the approach that should be noted concerns the increasing relationship between H and competition, 
which may not hold in certain other oligopoly equilibria. In fact, as De Bandt and Davis (2000) point out, P-R is somehow 
a joint test of underlying theory and competitive behavior. 
9. Conversely, less concentrated environments could engender collusive practices. 
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risk-adjusted rates of return across firms such that, in equilibrium, rates of return should 
not be correlated statistically with factor input prices. However, the fact that we observe 
market entry and exit might question the existence of an overall equilibrium in the market 
under investigation10. 
Another crucial assumption, on which the previous section elaborates, is that 
the P-R test only applies for single-output firms. Consequently, banks must be treated as 
producers of intermediation services by means of factor inputs such as labor, physical capital 
and financial capital. In other words, the entire scope of activities is needed in order to 
estimate the level of competition within the sector. However, even if the previous assumption 
is ignored, the analysis of separate segments of the market is hampered by accounting 
standards, since data are not detailed enough to estimate the appropriate reduced-form 
revenue equations. At last, other requirements inherent to the P-R approach relate to the cost 
structure, which must be homogeneous, and the price elasticity of demand, which must be 
greater than unity. 
Some authors claim that one of the advantages of the P-R model, as well as other 
non-structural models, is that there is no need to specify a relevant market, since 
the behavior of individual firms provides an indication of their market power11. This rationale 
could be misleading as the selection of firms included in the sample is implicitly revealing 
a geographical market. Conventionally, existing studies —and the current analysis is no 
exception— locate the relevant market within national boundaries12. 
Overall, the P-R model is regarded as a valuable tool for assessing market 
conditions. Since banks' revenues are more likely to be observable than output prices 
and quantities or actual costs, data availability becomes much less of a constraint and helps 
to explain why this model has been more successfully applied than the Iwata or the 
Bresnahan-Lau models. Indeed, such information is recorded in public accounting statements 
and readily available through several data sources. 
                                                                          
10. The assumption of long-run equilibrium should be considered as the most problematic within this approach. Indeed, 
a number of authors impose that banks have reached this steady state. 
11. The relevant market is theoretically defined by the largest set of suppliers of a particular product or service, including 
actual and potential competitors [Bikker (2004)]. 
12. In the Spanish case, it appears to be a sensible assumption due to the widespread establishment of large 
and medium-sized banks throughout the territory, and the scarce presence of foreign credit institutions [Gutiérrez de 
Rozas (2006)]. 
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4 Literature Review 
This subsection is intended to provide a brief summary of the articles that have applied the 
P-R methodology to Spain, either in cross-country studies or Spain-only studies (see Table I). 
As mentioned in the introduction, recent changes in the European banking industry have 
fueled a large literature on banking competition and concentration. 
The first study of European markets13 is due to Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and 
Thornton (1994), who carried out the P-R methodology on a sample of French, German, 
Italian, Spanish and UK banks for the period 1986-1989. Their results point towards an 
intermediate level of monopolistic competition in the Spanish case. 
A few years later, Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) focused on a sample of European 
countries between 1989 and 1996. They hardly found evidence of increasing competition 
during this period. A novelty put forward by these authors is the attachment of different 
weights to banks included in the sample. These weights are computed as the share of 
individual banks in the total volume of assets of the banking system. In this case, H-statistics 
are higher than those resulting from the unweighted model. 
In the same vein, Bikker and Haaf (2002) extend the analysis to 23 OECD countries 
over the period 1988-1998. For every single country, including Spain, results describe a 
monopolistic competition environment. They posit the distinction between several bank sizes, 
in order to capture different geographical markets. In particular, large, medium-sized and 
small banks are supposed to operate in an international, national and regional dimension, 
respectively. Competition appears to be stronger for large banks and weaker for small banks. 
These results are fully consistent with those obtained in the contemporary work by De Bandt 
and Davis (2000). 
Both Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) account for possible 
gradual changes in the market structure by introducing a logistic time curve model into the 
original P-R setting. Once, the competitive behavior of the banking industry is identified, 
their analyses focus on the relationship between competition and market structure. Their 
purpose is to check the validity of the SCP paradigm. Results support the conventional view 
that concentration impairs competition14. 
Another influential study belongs to Claessens and Laeven (2004), who exploit 
the broadest sample, by far, ever employed in a multi-country analysis of banking 
competition. They compute the H-statistic for fifty developed and developing countries for the 
period 1994-2001. According to their results, monopolistic competition is the best 
description of the markets under consideration. Subsequently, they draw attention on the 
                                                                          
13. It should be outlined that the earliest analyses applying the P-R approach to banking sectors were conducted 
by Nathan and Neave (1989), who applied it to the Canadian financial system, and Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and 
Thornton (1991), who focused on the Japanese case. Northcott (2004) and Staikouras et al. (2006) provide excellent 
and up-to-date surveys of worldwide studies devoted to this topic. 
14. However, most cross-country studies circumvent a key characteristic of several banking industries. When focusing 
on the relationship between competition and concentration, Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes are calculated on a national 
basis, even though such geographical scope may not be indicative of the actual level of concentration prevailing in 
regional or local markets. The German case is frequently used to highlight this feature. Germany exhibits an atomized 
financial market with highly concentrated local markets (at a Länder level) but a scarcely concentrated national market 
[Deutsche Bundesbank (2005)]. For Spain, there is no evidence of such disparities [Cebrián (1997)]. 
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factors underlying competition by regressing the estimated H-statistics on a number of 
country-specific characteristics. These refer to the presence of foreign banks, activity 
restrictions, entry regime, market structure, competition from the non-bank sector, general 
macroeconomic conditions and overall development of the country. They do not come across 
a straightforward relationship between competition and concentration, but find that fewer 
entry and activity restrictions (i.e. higher contestability) result in more competition. 
Weill (2004) measures banking competition for a sample of twelve EU countries over 
the period 1994-1999. Annual Tobit-based estimates of the H-statistic depict a decreasing 
pattern of monopolistic competition in Spain. In the second stage of the analysis, this author 
explores the relationship between competition and efficiency. Efficiency scores, estimated 
using a stochastic frontier approach, are regressed on the H-statistic and a set of explanatory 
variables including macrofactors, an intermediation ratio and geographical dummies. His 
results show a negative relationship between competition and efficiency. 
An interesting comparison between the Spanish and UK banking systems is 
conducted by Utrero-González (2004). Elaborating on the work by Bikker and Haaf (2002), 
the purpose of the analysis is to identify competitive divergences due to the introduction of 
the euro. Estimation results describe an overall scenario of monopolistic competition, in line 
with previous studies. The main innovation of the paper is the distinction between commercial 
banks and non-profit institutions. The former are reported to operate under conditions of 
quasi-perfect competition, whereas the latter seem to operate in a less competitive 
environment. 
More recently, Casu and Girardone (2006) focus on a sample containing the former 
EU-15 member countries. They extend the standard specification to account for bank 
efficiency, calculated by means of a non-parametric DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) 
approach. They regress the H-statistic against several structural indicators and estimated 
efficiency levels. The degree of concentration does not appear to be related to the level of 
competition. 
In an extensive paper, Staikouras et al. (2006) carry out the first multi-country 
analysis for the EU following enlargement to 25 Member States, covering the 1998-2002 
time-span. They find evidence of monopolistic competition with larger banks behaving more 
competitively than smaller banks, and new members showing higher levels of competition 
than former members. Complementarily, these authors try an atypical dependent variable 
in the reduced-form revenue equation, namely organic income, which is defined as interest 
revenue plus fee and commission income. 
The first Spain-only study was undertaken by Maudos and Pérez (2003), who 
focused on the period 1992-1999. Using a sample of commercial and savings banks, their 
investigation leads to conclude that competition decreases during the period under 
consideration (the full-sample estimation of the H-statistic is 0.71). They buttress their findings 
with the calculation of Lerner indexes, used to proxy the level of market power exerted by 
banks. 
Last of all, Garrido (2004) assesses the degree of competition among Spanish 
banks between 1994 and 2000 employing a wide variety of econometric techniques. In spite 
of the instability of least squares estimates for separate years, results are in keeping with 
monopolistic competition. Furthermore, during the last period under study the level of 
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competition decreased, confirming conclusions reached by other authors. Following Maudos 
and Pérez (2003) and Bikker and Haaf (2002), the level of competition is also measured 
separately for commercial and savings banks, on the one hand, and for large, medium-sized 
and small banks, on the other. 
Summing up, this compilation of articles seems to provide ample evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that monopolistic competition, albeit to varying degrees, is the 
prevailing environment among Spanish banks. In fact, monopolistic competition is quite a 
recurrent finding owing to the wide range of values the H-statistic can take within this 
scenario (between zero and unity). This context enhances the importance of several 
methodological issues concerning the empirical implementation of the P-R approach such as, 
inter alia, data, estimation techniques and sample period under consideration. 
Regarding data availability for banking studies, a few caveats are in order. The 
aforementioned studies display two common features (see Table I). First, they all draw upon 
samples obtained from commercial databases such as Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) and 
Fitch-IBCA Ltd, a London-based rating agency15. Since commercial data sources are biased 
in favor of larger firms, the actual level of competition might be underestimated. Second, 
these studies concentrate on five to eight year-long samples. Such coverage may turn out to 
be unsatisfactory to disentangle the fundamentals underlying banks' behavior. 
Two remarkable innovations of the current study are the use of a comprehensive 
data source, and the consideration of a longer period of time. Obviously, the purpose is to 
provide a reliable background for an accurate implementation of the P-R approach. The next 
section summarizes the main characteristics of the data employed in the analysis. 
 
                                                                          
15. With the exception of Maudos and Pérez (2003), who build a panel dataset with information gathered from annual 
reports by AEB (Asociación Española de Banca) and CECA (Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros). 
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5 Data 
The main database employed in this study is the information contained in balance sheets, 
income statements as well as complementary files, reported by depositary institutions to the 
Spanish supervisory authority (Banco de España) over the period beginning in 1986 and 
ending in 2005. 
In compliance with accounting standards, Spanish banks are compelled to 
enclose regular information about their activity and business structure. In particular, banks 
report detailed information concerning the volume and composition of assets held in terms of 
cash and balances, loans, debt securities, financial instruments, tangible/intangible assets, 
as well as deposits, debt certificates and other financial instruments on the liabilities side. 
With respect to the income statement (or profit and loss account), it embodies an appealing 
number of entries related to interest income and expenses, fees and commissions, gains 
and losses on financial assets and liabilities, as well as personnel, administrative and other 
operating expenses. Regarding complementary files, these documents provide valuable 
information about human resources and structural capacity of banking firms, in terms of staff 
composition and number of branches, respectively. 
Even though, Spanish data are available back in time for several years, due to 
differing reporting schemes between commercial ('bancos') and savings banks ('cajas de 
ahorros') 1986 was chosen to be the earliest observation date in the analysis16. The balance 
sheets and income statements are reported on a monthly and quarterly basis, respectively. 
For the sake of comparability, end-of-year aggregate figures from the balance sheet 
(December) and the income statement (fourth quarter) have been taken so as to transform 
accounting information into yearly data. 
No cooperative banks ('cooperativas de crédito') are included in the sample due to 
the lack of relevant data for the purpose of this study. In addition, Spanish cooperative banks 
represent a small share of the financial market. Branches of foreign banks with limited 
presence in the country are also excluded, specially in retail banking, to keep the units of 
analysis as much homogeneous as possible. The total number of banks with usable 
information starts with 184 in 1986 (of which 112 are commercial banks and 72 savings 
banks) and ends with 122 in 2005 (76 and 46, respectively). The consolidation process 
among Spanish banks explains the bulk of variation in the number of firms. Besides, just a 
handful of firms are recorded to have started or ceased operating during the period under 
consideration. 
It should be stressed that the population of commercial and savings banks 
considered in the paper represents the vast majority of the banking system (between 84 
and 92% of aggregate assets corresponding to the credit institutions sector). Therefore, the 
sample shall be regarded as fairly representative and comprehensive (Table II). As far as 
this author is concerned, this is the most exhaustive data sample ever employed in the 
implementation of the P-R methodology for the Spanish banking industry. 
                                                                          
16. Ever since, all variables can be straightforwardly defined. 
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First adjustments to these data were undertaken in a general consistency check, 
excluding all observations where banks reported missing values. In a next step, the data 
were adjusted for outliers. For each factor input price17, observations lying outside the 1-99th 
percentile range were deleted from the sample. An additional number of observations 
were dropped due to reporting errors in some regressing variables. Taken together, these 
adjustments amount to a reduction of the original raw data by 289 out of 3,232 observations 
(around 8.9%). Despite the above modifications, the absence of a selecting bias resulting 
from the partial omission of small depositary institutions, as in commercial databases, is a big 
advantage this study benefits of. 
The dataset has also taken into account mergers and acquisitions (M&A, hereinafter). 
In contrast with previous studies which circumvent this issue, each transaction is considered 
to engender an entirely new institution, implying a separate registration in the dataset. The 
purpose is to avoid structural breaks in the data, otherwise great deviations in the estimation 
results are expected to arise, as the majority of M&A involved medium-sized and large banks. 
Needless to say, the resulting panel is unbalanced since not all banks submitted 
information throughout the entire time span. The choice for an unbalanced dataset entails the 
advantage of permitting a greater number of observations to enter the estimations, however, 
at the cost of including firms which presumably do not behave as they would typically do in 
market equilibrium, because they are new entrants18, exiting or merged banks. 
Before embarking upon the assessment of the level of competition prevailing in the 
Spanish banking industry, a brief description of the market structure is in order. Several 
commonly used indicators of concentration, namely CR1, CR3, CR5, CR10, as well as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the numbers-equivalent (NE) are reported in Table III. 
CRn is the percentage market share of the n largest depositary institutions, ranked according 
to assets, in the sum of the assets of all banks in a particular observation date. The HHI is 
calculated as the sum of the squares of all depositary institutions’ market shares, according 
to total assets. The NE translates the measure of concentration, as reported by the HHI, into 
the number of equally-sized firms constituting the same level of concentration. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure III depicts the CR5 and the level of market 
share instability, measured by the instability index (II), over the period under consideration. 
The instability index was devised by Hymer and Pashigan (1962) and it is formally defined as: 
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where t,is  is the share of firm i at time t. The larger is the value of II, the more unstable is the 
industry. Abrupt rises have traditionally been related to the presence of fierce competition, 
regardless the degree of clustering19. According to the five-firm concentration we can 
distinguish two stages, namely 1986-2000, characterized by a moderate pattern of increasing 
                                                                          
17. As the next section will review, three input prices are considered, namely price of labor (PL), price of loanable funds 
(PLF) and price of capital expenditure (PCE). 
18. In particular, new entrants are supposed to behave more agressively (i.e. more competitively) in order to gain market 
share and fulfil their short-term objectives. 
19. Empirically, the index is not very sensitive to the exclusion of small companies. However, it should be recognized that 
the treatment of M&A may overstate the actual level of instability. Anyway, since this criterium has been maintained 
throughout the sample, the II should be regarded as a meaningful and consistent measure in relative terms. 
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consolidation, and 2001-2005, which exhibits a slightly decreasing path. By contrast, 
attending to the degree of instability up to four different stages can be recorded: 1987-1993 
is a phase dominated by sudden changes, which slows down during 1994-1998. A peak of 
instability is reached between 1999 and 200020 whereas a remarkable level of stability is 
achieved during 2001-2005. Overall, the aforementioned patterns of concentration and 
varying levels of market instability throughout the twenty-year-long sample period under 
consideration provide a suitable background for the empirical analysis of banking competition. 
                                                                          
20. A couple of M&A deals involving the two largest commercial banks took place in this period. 
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6 The Empirical Model 
Several specifications have been presented in the burgeoning literature devoted to the P-R 
methodology. For empirical purposes, the following operationalization of equation (11) is 
used21: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) itittittitt
ittittittitttit
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The dependent variable, NITA, is the ratio of Net Income to Total Assets. The set 
of explanatory variables embraces three factor input prices, namely PL (Price of Labor), 
PLF (Price of Loanable Funds) and PCE (Price of Capital Expenditure), as well as four 
bank-specific variables: EQTA (EQuity to Total Assets), LOATA (LOAns to Total Assets), 
LFTA (Loanable Funds to Total Assets) and the scale factor LDTLD, which represents the 
individual market share according to loans and deposits. Finally, itu is the disturbance term. 
The H-statistic at time t is given by the following expression: 
ttttH 321 βββ ++=  (15) 
At this stage of the analysis, it is worth elaborating on the choice of the 
aforementioned set of variables22, since former studies have employed a wide range of 
explanatory indicators. Whereas traditional approaches in the literature have used either gross 
interest or total income as dependent variable, the current exercise draws attention on net 
total income alone. This concept comprises interest income, net brokerage fees and 
commissions and net gains on financial assets and liabilities. The decision to consider total 
revenue, rather than only interest revenue, relies mainly on the fact that non-interest income 
has increased dramatically in recent years. This choice is supported, among others by Casu 
and Girardone (2006), who argue that in a more competitive environment, the distinction 
between interest and non-interest income becomes less relevant, as banks struggle for profits 
in both fronts23. By the same token, the existence of accounting differences across years24 is 
an additional argument in favor of a broader view of bank revenues [Staikouras et al. (2006)]. 
A number of authors employ unscaled revenues. The main drawback of this 
procedure is the strong correlation (close to unity) between the dependent variable and 
the scale factor, which would deliver non-significant coefficients for other explanatory 
variables. In order to abstract from size effects and, thus, avoid distorted estimations, the 
dependent variable is expressed as a ratio to total assets. 
On the other hand, there seems to be common agreement on the inputs used by 
banking firms, namely labor, loanable funds (comprising demand deposits and term deposits) 
                                                                          
21. Subscripts i and t refer to bank i and year t. 
22. Annex I contains a detailed description of each variable. 
23. De Bandt and Davis (2000), using OECD data, estimated that non-interest income accounted for 20 to 40% of total 
net income for a selected group of European banks between 1992 and 1996. These figures resulted from both an 
increasing trend of the non-interest income –which stems from the reinforcement of non-core business areas such 
as asset management, mutual funds and insurance– and the reduction of interest income.  
24. For instance, three major changes in financial reporting standards happened in Spain during the time span under 
consideration, namely in 1986, 1992 and 2005. 
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and physical capital (fixed capital plus materials), which is in line with the production process 
held by Sealey and Lindley (1977). A separate price is assigned to each. 
Factor input prices are commonly proxied by ratios of expenses to respective 
volumes. Concerning the price of labor, existing studies tend to use personnel expenses 
divided by total assets, due to the scarce availability of employment data in commercial 
databases. By contrast, in this study, PL is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total number of employees. It should be highlighted that the latter definition aims to provide a 
cleaner and more accurate measure of unit labor costs25. 
The price of loanable funds, PLF, is obtained by dividing the sum of interest 
expenses by the amount of loanable funds (which comprise deposits, tradable securities and 
subordinated instruments) outstanding at the end of each year. This formulation provides a 
broader measure of funding costs, in contrast with previous studies which usually restrict to 
the interest paid per deposit unit. On the other hand, the price or unit cost of physical capital 
(PCE) is conventionally calculated as the ratio of capital expenses (i.e. operating expenses, 
taxes and amortization) to the stock of fixed assets. 
Overall, the dependent variable and these three factor input prices show a strong 
variability. Figure IV(a) displays a dispersion graph corresponding to NITA which is 
characterized by a decreasing cyclical pattern. PL experiments a steady growth rate with 
increasing volatility, which may reflect changes in the staff composition26 —Figure IV(b)—. 
Noticeably, PLF shows a similar profile to NITA. In contrast with PL, the dispersion 
of PLF (measured by the distance between the first and the third quartile) 
has experienced a progressive reduction —Figure IV(c)—. Conversely, the price of capital 
expenditure —Figure IV(d)— shows, in the last few observation dates, a particularly striking 
spread. 
Input prices are followed by a set of bank-specific factors which, basically, are 
intended to catch differences in risk, business mix and size. Specifically, these control 
variables account for risk propensity (captured by EQTA), variations in the relative weight 
of the loan portfolio (which are mirrored in LOATA) and importance of deposits in the balance 
sheet (LFTA). LDTLD is included to consider the possible impact of scale economies. 
Last, TASS (Total ASSets) and BRANCH (number of BRANCHes), are other variables 
designed to control for the firm size27. 
Summary statistics of the aforementioned variables are presented in Table IV. 
Regarding the set of bank-specific variables, mean values for LFTA remain fairly stable 
throughout the sample period (around 87%), whereas LDTLD experiments a continuous 
growth, ranging from 0.6 to 1%. Remarkably, average figures for EQTA and LOATA are quite 
similar to those reported by Staikouras et al. (2006). However, it should be highlighted 
that the mean volumes of total assets (TASS) are somewhat lower, which seemingly 
reveals that their sample is biased towards larger banks. On average terms, the number of 
branches increases dramatically during the time span under consideration. 
                                                                          
25. The former is actually a relative weight of personnel expenses in the balance sheet. 
26. Since the entire spectrum of employees is comprised in the computation of the labor price, rises in PL could spring 
from a higher proportion of highly qualified workers. 
27. As the next section will review, TASS and BRANCH are only used in the weighted version of the model. 
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Finally, Table V contains the correlation matrix of all the variables involved in the 
empirical analysis. As expected, the dependent variable exhibits a weak correlation with 
the scale variables. Noticeably, low values are reported for PL and PCE in the first column 
(NITA). These figures suggest the finding of close-to-zero and non-significant elasticities in the 
next step of the analysis, which is devoted to the estimation of the econometric model 
presented above. 
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7 Estimation Results 
The reduced-form revenue function stated in equation (14) is linear in its unknown parameters 
and, therefore, amenable to estimation by standard methods. In order to exploit both 
the cross-sectional and the time-series dimensions of the panel dataset, two different 
least squares regression procedures have been performed. In particular, subsample and 
full-sample estimates for the period 1986-2005 have been obtained by means of pooled 
generalized least squares (PGLS) and pooled weighted least squares (PWLS). 
Ordinary least squares is the simplest and most common estimation procedure 
employed in the P-R literature. However, in order to offset the potential existence of 
heteroskedasticity in the data, generalized least squares was considered a more appropriate 
method to start with28. As in many other studies, the current dataset is not large enough to 
attain robust annual estimates for the eight parameters in the model. Accordingly, the sample 
period is divided in four lustrums: 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. 
Table VI displays PGLS regression results. The dependent variable, NITA, appears to 
be positevely related to the price of loanable funds (PLF). By contrast, the price of labor (PL) 
and the price of capital expenditure (PCE) are negatively associated with the net income 
variable, albeit to to a very limited extent. Regarding the coefficients of the remaining 
explanatory variables, a negative sign for EQTA was expected to arise because lower 
capital ratios are supposed to lead to higher bank revenues. However, estimation results 
show positive values for this variable. Presumably, an explanatory hypothesis may state 
that reinforced capital buffers encourage risk-taking. Hence, banks could be improving their 
earning capacity through riskier loan portfolios. The reported positive coefficients for LOATA 
seem plausible because more loans reflect more potential income. Last, evidence for 
LFTA and the scale variable LDTLD is blurred by their non-significance. 
Figure V(a) plots the H-statistics corresponding to the PGLS estimation outcome. 
The first stage exhibits the lowest level (0.55), but rises substantially during the second 
stage (0.70) and reaches it maximum during the third phase (0.79). Noteworthingly, 
the H-statistic falls to an intermediate position (0.55) during the last stage. This result is 
concurrent with the decline in the degree of concentration of the industry —Figure III—. 
In accordance with these results, monopolistic competition (MC) is the proper assessment 
for the Spanish banking market, since both the null hypotheses of H equal to zero (oligopoly) 
and H equal to one (perfect competition) are rejected, at the 90% confidence level, in 
each of the four subsamples under consideration. The full-period estimate of the H-statistic 
stands at 0.78. 
Several striking features of the estimation outcome should be highlighted. First, the 
marked rise of the H-statistic between the first and second subsample periods is likely 
to be explained by a handful of contemporary policy initiatives which, both at the European 
and national levels, aimed to create a unified market for banking services. In particular, at the 
                                                                          
28. By the way, several tests have previously been performed cross-sectionally in order to check out the validity of 
the long-run equilibrium assumption. The dependent variable in equation (14) was ordinarily replaced by a proxy for the 
return on equity (ROE), which was specifically designed for this purpose. For every single year, but two, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. These equilibrium test results are available upon request to 
the author. 
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national level, legal restrictions on the geographical scope of savings banks were removed 
in 1989. This development triggered the consolidation and outward expansion processes 
among savings banks29, enhancing the level of integration of the Spanish banking market30. 
Besides, at the European level, remaining constraints on the number of branches of foreign 
banks in member countries were abrogated as a result of the Second Banking Co-ordination 
Directive31 (enacted in 1992). 
Second, among the constituent parts of the H-statistic only the price of loanable 
funds contributes significantly to the explanation of the net income of banks. By contrast, 
both the price of labor and the price of capital expenditure provide a deceiving outcome 
due to their scarce correlation with the dependent variable. 
Third, the dispersion of the price of loanable funds fell during the last years of 
the sample —Figure IV(c)—. This fall is even more dramatic if we attend to the distance 
between 1-99th percentiles32. The fact that this reduction is not entirely mirrored in the 
volatility of the dependent variable —Figure IV(a)— is responsible for shrinking the elasticity 
of this input and, hence, the value of the H-statistic corresponding to the fourth stage33.  
Last but not least, the overall level of competition during the nineties is, in 
comparison with former studies, relatively high and stable. Table IX gathers P-R results 
for the Spanish banking industry (ES), as well as for Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). In most cases, an intermediate level 
of monopolistic competition, with H-statistics varying from 0.3 to 0.6, is recorded for Spain. 
Remarkably, Germany does also exhibit a similar range of values, whereas the US appears 
to have slightly less competitive banks. Without exception, the PGLS estimates obtained 
in this study stand well above the figures reported in the literature. 
A number of authors discriminate between small, medium-sized and large banks34. 
However, such distinction is not made in this analysis since, basically, all banks are presumed 
to offer an homogeneous variety of financial products. An alternative approach, set forth by 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), consists in estimating a model where banks are weighted 
according to their size in terms of total assets. This approach is intuitively justified by the fact 
that larger firms may be able to influence the pricing strategy of smaller market participants35. 
Likewise, it seems sensible that in order to obtain a more representative and realistic 
picture of the actual level of competition, those banks with a larger number of customers 
                                                                          
29. Up to that date, savings banks were confined to the regional markets they belonged to. 
30. Accordingly, the distinction between commercial and savings banks, which other authors posit, becomes 
presumably irrelevant. Nevertheless, the main feature that remains to distinguish savings banks from other type of 
financial institutions is their organizational form. Savings banks, which typically began as mutual funds, operate with a 
significant level of state involvement. Despite being a challenging issue, whether its particular governance regime can 
affect or not their competitive behavior is hardly analyzable under the P-R approach and is well beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
31. Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2003) and Fernández de Guevara, Maudos and Pérez (2005) provide concise overviews 
of the liberalization-oriented policy measures which came into force during this period at the national and European 
levels, respectively. 
32. For the sake of presentation, Figure IV only depicts the first and third quartile range. Otherwise, the strong upward 
biases these variables show would seriously distort the graphs. 
33. This convergence in the price of loanable funds brings up an insight due to Shaffer (2004) which states that if 
price-taking firms buy homogeneous inputs in a common set of markets, the data will lack any variation on account 
of the so-called ‘absolute version of the law of one price’. Ultimately, no regressions can be run on such a sample. 
34. For instance, Bikker and Haaf (2002) split up their worldwide sample according to the following criterium: 
the smallest 50% firms constitute the small-bank sample, the largest 10% form the large-bank sample, and the 
remainder 40% make up the medium-sized sample. 
35. A detailed analysis of the price setting behavior of Spanish banks is provided in Martín-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and 
Saurina (2007). 
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(proxied by the total amount of assets) and an extensive nationwide presence (gauged by the 
number of branches) ought to have a greater impact on the estimation outcome36. 
Tables VII and VIII collect PWLS regression results. Employing TASS and BRANCH 
as weighting variables, this estimation procedure37 turns out to improve the significance of the 
explanatory variables (p-values are surpassingly lower). Besides, the elasticity of PLF and, 
therefore, the H-statistic are somewhat higher than in the standard model. The evolution 
of the H-statistic describes a different pattern from the unweighted setup. The H-statistic 
does now evidence a remarkable staggered increase —Figures V(b) and V(c)—. 
The entire time span PWLS estimates (0.95 and 1.00) may induce to think of the 
existence of a more competitive environment among larger banks. This conjecture is in 
keeping with Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), who point out that larger banks are relatively 
more active in international wholesale markets, where competition is regarded to be more 
fierce. By contrast, retail and corporate finance markets, where small and medium-sized 
banks operate, are assumed to be less competitive. 
An alternative explanation would consider instead that large banks are closer 
to long-run equilibrium than smaller banks, which presumably embrace new arrivees 
[Shaffer (2004)]. If that is the case, a greater value of the H-statistic does not reliably imply 
that the former behave more competitively. However, since the long-run equilibrium condition 
has been successfully verified for the entire sample of banks, this criticism does not apply. 
Moreover, this encouraging finding, which deserves to be regarded as the foremost 
contribution of the analysis, discredits the widespread hypothesis which states that large 
banks are prone to perform non-competitively, as it would have led to a lower value of 
the P-R indicator. 
                                                                          
36. Besides, weighting can also be justified on econometric grounds. From an ‘asymptotic point of view', large banks 
are expected to behave more 'normal' than smaller ones. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) corroborate this argument 
with the empirical finding of smaller disturbance terms for larger firms. Thus, weighted estimation appears to be more 
efficient. 
37. PWLS estimates have been computed by means of Stata's iweight (importance weight) option, which enables to 
weight the set of observations according to any variable specifically designed for this purpose. In the current analysis 
two scale factors –TASS and BRANCH– are used separately to carry out PWLS results. A shortcoming which goes hand 
in hand with this procedure is related with the possible existence of heteroskedasticity in the data. Obviously, with 
weighting procedures –and this one is no exception– there is no chance of using White's variance and covariance 
matrix. However, the log-specification of equation (14) is intended to undermine this circumstance. 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
Banks play a prominent role in the allocation of economic resources. Furthermore, they exert 
a fundamental influence on asset transformation, provision of liquidity insurance, access to 
payment services, and thereby, are a key to economic growth and development. In this 
context, the need for reliable analytical instruments devoted to the measurement of the level 
of competition prevailing in banking markets appears to be broadly justified. 
Nevertheless, the interest of researchers in this issue was not elicited until the recent 
trend towards consolidation in the European banking industry. Ever since, the analysis of 
competition has turned into a burgeoning field in banking economics. Despite the great 
number of investigations which have focused on the Spanish case, mainly in multi-country 
studies, evidence on the actual level of competition is rather mixed and still subject to debate. 
In order to shed light on this topic, the current study attempts to carry out an 
exhaustive analysis of the Spanish banking industry. In particular, it extends previous 
studies to several respects. First, a substantially longer period of time, covering two decades 
(1986-2005), is under consideration. Second, a comprehensive panel dataset of commercial 
and savings banks has been constructed using the information these institutions report to the 
Spanish supervisory authority (Banco de España). 
The empirical analysis is grounded on a widespread non-structural approach due to 
Panzar and Rosse (1987). Overall, the estimation outcome leads to conclude that the 
prevailing level of competition is quite higher than reported in the literature, and in 
the particular case of large banks it is really close to perfect competition. Second, there 
is no apparent relationship between competition and market structure —in terms of 
concentration and instability—. 
The robustness of the results presented herein is challenged by a recent paper due 
to Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2006). These authors analyze the role of size, 
efficiency, specialization and concentration, among other factors, in the explanation of market 
power. Using as laboratory the Spanish banking system in a fairly similar sample period 
(1986-2002), they estimate Lerner indexes to proxy the degree of market power. The two 
major results of this piece of work have to do with an increasing pattern of market power 
starting in the mid-1990s and the lack of significance of the level of concentration in 
the explanation of this trend. Whether the former finding can be reconciled or not with the 
evolution of competition described in the current analysis is quite a complex issue. 
Nevertheless, it deserves a brief comment on an intuitive difference between the terms 
'competition' and 'market power', since they are often used interchangeably. Market power 
is, basically, an individual phenomenon which results from the behavioral pricing strategy of a 
particular firm. By contrast, competition should be regarded as a collective phenomenon 
stemming from the aggregate interaction of the set of market participants. Therefore, the 
empirical relationship between them is not as straightforward as it may seem at first glance38. 
                                                                          
38. Indeed, the Lerner index is an indicator of market power, not competition. It is based on prices and marginal costs, 
and provides a separate figure for each of the firms in the industry. Conversely, the H-statistic is just an indicator of 
competition, not market power. Based on the price elasticities of factor input prices in a reduced-form revenue equation, 
it provides a single figure for the whole industry. 
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Noteworthingly, the lack of significance of market concentration is concurrent with 
the results achieved in this article. In a sense, as Claessens and Laeven (2004) claim, this 
finding is consistent with the contestability theory. If carefully explored, the validity of 
the contestability theory may deliver far-reaching policy implications. Up to date, worldwide 
competition authorities draw upon merger guidelines based on indirect yardsticks such as 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. These heuristic procedures are in keeping with out of fashion 
structural approaches, within the classical IO theory, which posit that concentration impairs 
competition. The fact that concentration ratios may not provide an appropriate criterium to 
evaluate the actual impact of a certain deal, should be a matter of great concern39. 
Moreover, competition policies should be subject to deep revision. A step in the right 
direction would involve the use of NEIO indicators such as the H-statistic reviewed in this 
article, which stands out for several advantages regarding data availability, the simplicity of 
the estimation procedure and its clear interpretation. An additional argument which backs 
up the P-R methodology as a valuable tool for competition monitoring relies on its flexibility to 
account for characteristics specific to each sector. To date, few studies have outlined this 
issue. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the financial sector is only comparable to a limited 
extent to other type of industries. As a matter of fact, there are conflicting views on 
the desirable degree of competition in banking40. From a theoretical perspective, intense 
competition is assumed to lower intermediation expenses and contribute to the improvement 
of efficiency, at the cost of shortening the average duration of lending relationships and 
eroding banks' profitability. Therefore, both the solvency and the ability of financial institutions 
to withstand liquidity shocks could be seriously undermined. Remarkably, this trade-off 
context enhances the role played by banking regulators, inasmuch as certain prudential tools 
may turn out to provide a necessary buffer against adverse developments. 
In order to sharpen our understanding of financial stability, forthcoming research 
efforts ought to direct attention towards the common fundamentals underlying competition 
and market structure in banking industries. At present, there is a deal of work that needs to 
be done. 
                                                                          
39. In fact, perfect competition could emerge in highly concentrated scenarios, and vice versa. 
40. For a detailed discussion on the optimal level of competition in the banking sector, see Cetorelli (2001) and 
Vives (2001). 
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APPENDIX 
Annex I.  Definition of Variables 
1. Dependent Variable 
• NITA: Ratio of Net Income to Total Assets (%). 
Net Income = Interest and Similar Income + Variable portfolio Income + Fee and 
Commission Income + Gains on Financial Assets and liabilities - Brokerage Fee and 
Commission Expenses - Losses on Financial Assets and Liabilities. 
2. Explanatory Variables  
2.1 Factor Input Prices 
• PL: Price of Labor (Ratio of Personnel Expenses to Staff Number) (thousands of 
Euros/employee). 
• PLF: Price of Loanable Funds (Ratio of Interest Expenses to Loanable Funds) (%). 
Interest Expenses (IE) = IE from Banco de España + IE from Credit Institutions + IE 
from the Spanish General Government + IE from Other Resident Sectors + IE from 
Non-resident Creditors + IE from Loans and Other Tradable Securities. 
Loanable Funds (LF) = Deposits from Banco de España + Deposits from Credit 
Institutions + Deposits from the Spanish General Government + Deposits from Other 
Resident Sectors + Deposits from Other Non-resident Creditors + Loans and Other 
Tradables Securities + Subordinated Instruments. 
• PCE: Price of Capital Expenditure (Ratio of Capital Expenditure to Fixed Assets) (%). 
Capital Expenditure = Operating Expenses + Contributions and Taxes + Fixed Assets 
Amortization and Provisions. 
2.2 Bank Specific Variables 
2.2.1 RISK VARIABLE 
• EQAS: Ratio of Equity to Total Assets (%). 
Equity = - Issued Capital - Unregularized Loss + Special Funds + Capital or       
Endowment Fund + Reserves + Net Profit (Loss). 
2.2.2 BUSINESS-MIX VARIABLES 
• LOATA: Ratio of Loans to Other Resident Sectors to Total Assets (%). 
• LFTA: Ratio of Loanable Funds to Total Assets (%). 
2.2.3 SCALE VARIABLES 
• LDTLD: Individual Volume of Loans and Deposits to Aggregate Volume of Loans 
and Deposits (to Other Resident Sectors) (%). 
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• TASS: Total Assets (hundreds of millions of Euros). 
• BRANCH: Number of branches. 
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Table I.  Available Panzar-Rosse Studies for the Spanish Banking Industry 
Authors 
Countries 
considered 
No. of 
Spanish 
banks 
Period Source 
Cross-country studies 
including Spain 
 
Molyneux et al. 
(1994) 
DE, ES, FR, 
IT, UK 
116 1986-1989 IBCA 
Bikker and 
Groeneveld (2000) 
15 EU 
countries 
80 1989-1996 Fitch-IBCA 
Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) 
23 OECD 
countries 
154 1990-1998 Fitch-IBCA 
Weill (2004) 
12 EU 
countries 
152 1994-1999 Bankscope 
Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) 
50 countries 157 1994-2001 Bankscope 
Utrero-González 
(2004) 
ES, UK 204 1996-2002 Bankscope 
Casu and 
Girardone (2006) 
15 EU 
countries 
100 1997-2003 Bankscope 
Staikouras et al. 
(2006) 
DE, ES, FR, 
IT, UK 
108 1998-2002 
Bankscope, 
Fitch-IBCA 
Spain-only studies  
Maudos and Pérez 
(2003) 
ES 155 1992-1999 AEB, CECA 
Garrido (2004) ES 117 1994-2000 Bankscope 
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Table II.  Number of Banks in the Sample 
No. of observations per bank 
type 
Year 
No. of 
banks 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Comprehensiveness* 
1986 184 112 72 84.0 
1987 186 114 72 84.9 
1988 191 115 76 87.6 
1989 191 116 75 88.2 
1990 186 121 65 81.5 
1991 178 123 55 85.3 
1992 177 124 53 81.9 
1993 176 125 51 86.1 
1994 174 123 51 91.1 
1995 172 122 50 90.7 
1996 169 119 50 90.8 
1997 166 116 50 91.5 
1998 157 107 50 93.8 
1999 149 100 49 93.1 
2000 137 90 47 92.9 
2001 136 90 46 92.3 
2002 132 86 46 92.2 
2003 126 80 46 92.3 
2004 123 77 46 92.3 
2005 122 76 46 92.4 
    1986-2005           3,232 2,136                    1,096                             90.6 
 
Note: Comprehensiveness refers to the percentage of assets corresponding to Spanish depositary 
institutions which is accounted for by the banks included in the sample. 
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Table III.  Market Structure Indicators based on Banks’ Total Assets 
Year CR1 CR3 CR5 CR10 HHI NE II 
1986 7.5 21.3 33.5 48.5 310 32 - 
1987 7.6 20.8 32.4 47.7 298 34 8.0 
1988 10.8 23.7 33.2 48.0 327 31 45.3 
1989 10.1 22.5 33.0 46.9 312 32 9.3 
1990 10.4 25.8 35.7 47.6 344 29 38.3 
1991 9.7 24.6 36.0 51.4 359 28 36.5 
1992 10.1 25.4 37.2 49.8 365 27 21.1 
1993 11.8 29.0 41.4 53.5 434 23 34.9 
1994 9.9 26.4 38.7 54.2 398 25 17.7 
1995 9.5 25.8 38.5 54.4 393 25 10.5 
1996 10.3 27.5 39.5 54.5 412 24 9.7 
1997 10.8 28.3 39.8 54.6 420 24 9.4 
1998 10.6 27.7 41.9 57.5 446 22 18.5 
1999 16.7 35.9 48.2 60.4 608 16 42.6 
2000 19.0 43.1 53.8 63.9 801 12 48.7 
2001 17.5 41.1 51.4 62.2 733 14 7.7 
2002 16.2 39.7 50.1 61.4 676 15 9.7 
2003 15.6 39.1 49.4 61.9 661 15 7.2 
2004 15.3 37.4 47.8 62.4 624 16 8.5 
2005 15.1 36.5 47.1 62.8 607 16 7.4 
 
Note: CRn, HHI, NE and II stand for Concentration Ratio of the n largest firms, Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, Numbers-Equivalent and Instability Index, respectively. CRn is the percentage market share of 
the n largest banks, ranked according total assets, in the sum of the assets of all banks in each 
observation date. HHI is the sum of the squares of all banks’ percentage market shares, according to 
total assets, and ranges from 0 to 10,000. The NE is the number of equally-sized firms constituting the 
same level of concentration as reported by the HHI. The II measures the aggregate difference in the 
banks’ percentage market shares between two consecutive years. 
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Table IV.  Descriptive Statistics 
Mean NITA PL PLF PCE EQTA LOATA LFTA LDTLD TASS BRANCH 
1986 10.5 25.4 7.1 55.4 7.8 36.2 88.0 0.58 12.9 143.6 
1987 10.9 27.2 7.4 70.9 8.5 38.3 87.3 0.57 13.6 139.7 
1988 10.6 33.1 6.9 74.8 9.6 41.2 86.4 0.55 16.3 156.3 
1989 10.8 34.2 7.6 86.5 10.1 39.9 86.0 0.55 19.3 164.0 
1990 11.6 35.0 8.7 96.1 10.6 38.6 85.2 0.56 20.5 156.6 
1991 11.8 36.5 8.7 91.9 11.0 40.5 85.2 0.59 25.2 169.2 
1992 11.3 38.3 8.3 111.1 10.4 40.3 86.2 0.59 27.4 169.4 
1993 11.4 41.7 8.2 118.4 10.0 37.0 86.9 0.62 35.8 179.2 
1994 9.0 42.7 6.1 121.9 10.2 36.6 86.8 0.61 38.5 192.2 
1995 9.6 45.9 6.9 125.1 9.8 37.8 86.9 0.60 40.2 197.4 
1996 9.0 48.7 6.2 118.8 9.5 37.7 87.2 0.64 46.6 210.8 
1997 7.7 50.5 4.6 141.8 9.8 40.4 87.4 0.64 50.2 216.8 
1998 6.5 51.5 3.6 132.8 9.4 44.9 87.4 0.70 60.1 244.9 
1999 5.5 54.5 2.5 125.5 9.1 49.7 87.2 0.74 69.1 260.5 
2000 5.9 54.2 3.3 158.9 9.9 51.7 86.0 0.78 81.2 273.3 
2001 6.2 55.7 3.6 167.9 10.2 53.5 86.1 0.81 90.7 280.3 
2002 5.4 58.6 2.7 196.0 9.9 56.0 86.5 0.84 98.9 287.7 
2003 4.9 60.9 2.0 242.7 9.6 59.1 86.9 0.91 122.0 317.0 
2004 4.5 63.0 1.8 206.4 9.7 61.1 87.1 0.97 143.9 348.7 
2005 4.3 63.9 1.9 244.0 6.3 66.8 90.1 1.00 183.6 371.5 
 
Note: NITA: Net Income to Total Assets; PL: Price of Labor; PLF: Price of Loanable Funds; PCE: Price of Capital 
Expenditure; EQTA: Equity to Total Assets; LOATA: Loans to Total Assets; LFTA: Loanable Funds to Total Assets; LDTLD: 
Loans and Deposits To aggregate Loans and Deposits; TASS: Total ASSets; BRANCH: Number of Branches. 
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Table V.  Correlation Matrix 
1986-
2005 
NITA PL PLF PCE EQTA LOATA LFTA LDTLD TASS BRANCH
NITA 1.00          
PL -0.37 1.00         
PLF 0.80 -0.20 1.00        
PCE -0.12 0.45 0.00 1.00       
EQTA 0.16 0.00 0.08 -0.09 1.00      
LOATA -0.18 -0.06 -0.33 -0.13 -0.05 1.00     
LFTA -0.17 -0.10 -0.12 0.01 -0.87 0.15 1.00    
LDTLD -0.10 -0.02 -0.13 -0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.01 1.00   
TASS -0.19 0.10 -0.17 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.83 1.00  
BRANCH -0.13 -0.03 -0.18 -0.18 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.95 0.81 1.00 
 
Note: NITA: Net Income to Total Assets; PL: Price of Labor; PLF: Price of Loanable Funds; PCE: Price of 
Capital Expenditure; EQTA: Equity to Total Assets; LOATA: Loans to Total Assets; LFTA: Loanable Funds to 
Total Assets; LDTLD: Loans and Deposits To aggregate Loans and Deposits; TASS: Total Assets; BRANCH: 
Number of Branches. 
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Table VI.  Pooled Generalized Least Squares (PGLS) Estimation Results 
 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(NITA) 
 
coefficient 
p-value 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005 
      
-0.001 -0.015 -0.010 -0.009 -0.016 Ln(PL) 
0.582 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 
0.555 0.717 0.796 0.555 0.795 Ln(PLF) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 Ln(PCE) 
0.000 0.073 0.444 0.102 0.003 
0.146 0.006 0.088 0.090 0.060 Ln(EQTA) 
0.001 0.905 0.080 0.002 0.014 
0.041 0.045 0.024 0.006 0.017 Ln(LOATA) 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.400 0.000 
0.168 -0.041 -0.009 0.046 0.009 Ln(LFTA) 
0.012 0.592 0.908 0.245 0.831 
0.058 0.021 -0.014 -0.040 -0.009 Ln(LDTLD) 
0.008 0.361 0.523 0.029 0.448 
-0.061 0.116 0.064 0.034 0.083 cons 
0.166 0.032 0.268 0.214 0.002 
      
No. of obs. 853 824 718 548 2943 
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.44 0.32 0.73 
      
H-statistic 0.548MC 0.700 MC 0.786 MC 0.546 MC 0.777 MC 
F-stat 448.45 533.99 223.88 28.14 2924.13 H0: H=0 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-stat 306.30 98.46 16.91 19.12 241.05 H0: H=1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: Superscript MC (Monopolistic Competition) indicates that H=0 and H=1 are rejected at the 5% significance level.  
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Table VII.  Pooled Weighted Least Squares (PWLS) Estimation Results 
 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(NITA) 
Weighting variable: TASS 
 
coefficient 
p-value 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005 
      
0.000 -0.013 -0.016 -0.010 -0.018 Ln(PL) 
0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.528 0.800 0.977 1.040 0.968 Ln(PLF) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 Ln(PCE) 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
0.201 0.101 0.113 0.064 0.110 Ln(EQTA) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.051 0.040 0.033 0.025 0.018 Ln(LOATA) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.178 -0.006 0.042 -0.006 0.041 Ln(LFTA) 
0.000 0.348 0.000 0.001 0.000 
0.005 0.008 -0.041 -0.024 -0.023 Ln(LDTLD) 
0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.076 0.073 0.042 0.048 0.056 cons 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
No. of obs. 14122 27437 43413 68424 153397 
R-squared 0.56 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.88 
      
H-statistic 0.526MC 0.790 MC 0.962 MC 1.034 MC 0.952 MC 
F-stat 14305.73 31798.97 54399.76 55024.11 350000 H0: H=0 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-stat 11683.48 2238.56 83.45 58.85 869.7 H0: H=1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: Superscript MC (Monopolistic Competition) indicates that H=0 and H=1 are rejected at the 5% significance level.  
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Table VIII.  Pooled Weighted Least Squares (PWLS) Estimation Results 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(NITA) 
Weighting variable: BRANCH 
 
coefficient 
p-value 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005 
      
-0.001 -0.010 -0.018 -0.022 -0.018 Ln(PL) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.545 0.807 1.014 1.053 1.013 Ln(PLF) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.008 0.016 0.002 0.010 0.005 Ln(PCE) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.260 0.225 0.216 0.059 0.213 Ln(EQTA) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.054 0.062 0.042 0.028 0.024 Ln(LOATA) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.244 0.170 0.175 -0.008 0.157 Ln(LFTA) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.019 0.019 0.000 0.006 -0.017 Ln(LDTLD) 
0.000 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.000 
-0.125 -0.072 -0.046 0.093 -0.031 cons 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
No. of obs. 129787 149206 171882 174190 625065 
R-squared 0.59 0.76 0.82 0.72 0.92 
      
H-statistic 0.552MC 0.812MC 0.998PC 1.042MC 1.001PC 
F-stat 120000 220000 500000 200000 2000000 H0: H=0 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-stat 77035.18 11797.27 3.03 322.37 1.77 H0: H=1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.183 
 
Note: Superscript MC (Monopolistic Competition) indicates that H=0 and H=1 are rejected at the 5% significance level. Superscript PC 
(Perfect Competition) indicates that H=0 is rejected but H=1 is not rejected at the 5% significance level. 
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          Table IX.  Panzar-Rosse Model Results in Other Studies 
 
 
 
H-statistics This study  
Authors  
 ES DE FR IT UK US 
Period ES 
Cross-country studies   PGLS PWLSTASS PWLSBRANCH 
Molyneux et al. (1994) 0.47 0.13 0.73 -0.61 0.62 - 1986-1989 0.53 0.51 0.55 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) 0.58 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.72 - 1989-1996 0.67 0.75 0.78 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) - 0.27 0.19 0.51 - 0.55 1992-1996 0.72 0.81 0.81 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) 0.59 0.62 0.70 0.82 0.63 0.55 1990-1998 0.74 0.87 0.92 
Weill (2004) 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.57 - 1994-1999 0.78 0.96 0.97 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) 0.53 0.58 0.69 0.60 0.74 0.41 1994-2001 0.78 0.96 0.99 
Utrero-González (2004) 0.29 - - - 0.49 - 1996-2002 0.76 0.96 0.99 
Casu and Girardone (2006) 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.41 0.32 - 1997-2003 0.65 0.96 0.97 
Staikouras et al. (2006) 0.52 0.50 0.79 0.67 0.67 - 1998-2002 0.59 0.74 0.72 
Spain-only studies   PGLS PWLSTASS PWLSBRANCH 
Maudos and Pérez (2003) 0.71 - - - - - 1992-1999 0.81 0.95 0.97 
Garrido (2004) 0.57 - - - - - 1994-2000 0.79 0.97 0.99 
This study  1986-2005 0.78 0.95 1.00 
 
                Note: For the sake of comparability, reported H-statistics for other studies are, whenever available, full-sample least squares estimates. PGLS stands for Pooled Generalized Least 
Squares. PWLSTASS and PWLSBRANCH stand for Pooled Weighted Least Squares with TASS (Total Assets) and BRANCH (Number of Branches) as weighting variables, respectively.
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Figure III.  Market Structure and Consolidation in the Spanish Banking Industry 
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Figure IV.  Dispersion Graphs 
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Note: For each year, the bottom of the box represents the first quartile and the top represents the third quartile. 
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Figure V.  Estimation Results  
(a) Pooled Generalized Least Squares (PGLS) Estimates 
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(b) Pooled Weighted Least Squares (PWLS) Estimates according to total assets 
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(c) Pooled Weighted Least Squares (PWLS) Estimates according to the number of branches 
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
H
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS  
WORKING PAPERS1  
0626 CRISTINA BARCELÓ: A Q-model of labour demand. 
0627 JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA: Neighborhood effects in economic growth. 
0628 NUNO MARTINS AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Does limited access to mortgage debt explain why young adults 
live with their parents? 
0629 LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ AND IGNACIO HERNANDO: Competition and price adjustment in the euro area. 
0630 FRANCISCO ALONSO, ROBERTO BLANCO AND GONZALO RUBIO: Option-implied preferences adjustments, 
density forecasts, and the equity risk premium.  
0631 JAVIER ANDRÉS, PABLO BURRIEL AND ÁNGEL ESTRADA: BEMOD: A dsge model for the Spanish economy 
and the rest of the Euro area. 
0632 JAMES COSTAIN AND MARCEL JANSEN: Employment fluctuations with downward wage rigidity: The role of 
moral hazard. 
0633 RUBÉN SEGURA-CAYUELA: Inefficient policies, inefficient institutions and trade. 
0634 RICARDO GIMENO AND JUAN M. NAVE: Genetic algorithm estimation of interest rate term structure. 
0635 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA, JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ-MÍNGUEZ AND MARÍA SEBASTIÁ-BARRIEL: Non-linear 
adjustment of import prices in the European Union.  
0636 AITOR ERCE-DOMÍNGUEZ: Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises. 
0637 ANTON NAKOV: Optimal and simple monetary policy rules with zero floor on the nominal interest rate. 
0638 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA AND ÁNGEL GAVILÁN: Current accounts in the euro area: An intertemporal approach. 
0639 FRANCISCO ALONSO, SANTIAGO FORTE AND JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Implied default barrier in credit 
default swap premia. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
0701 PRAVEEN KUJAL AND JUAN RUIZ: Cost effectiveness of R&D and strategic trade policy. 
0702 MARÍA J. NIETO AND LARRY D. WALL: Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors’ prompt 
corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the EU? 
0703 PHILIP VERMEULEN, DANIEL DIAS, MAARTEN DOSSCHE, ERWAN GAUTIER, IGNACIO HERNANDO, 
ROBERTO SABBATINI AND HARALD STAHL: Price setting in the euro area: Some stylised facts from individual 
producer price data. 
0704 ROBERTO BLANCO AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Have real interest rates really fallen that much in Spain? 
0705 OLYMPIA BOVER AND JUAN F. JIMENO: House prices and employment reallocation: International evidence. 
0706 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND JOSÉ M.ª SERENA: Global financial integration, monetary policy and reserve 
accumulation. Assessing the limits in emerging economies. 
0707 ÁNGEL LEÓN, JAVIER MENCÍA AND ENRIQUE SENTANA: Parametric properties of semi-nonparametric 
distributions, with applications to option valuation. 
0708 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND DANIEL NAVIA: Equilibrium exchange rates in the new EU members: external 
imbalances vs. real convergence. 
0709 GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ AND JAVIER MENCÍA: Modelling the distribution of credit losses with observable and latent 
factors. 
0710 JAVIER ANDRÉS, RAFAEL DOMÉNECH AND ANTONIO FATÁS: The stabilizing role of government size. 
0711 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Measurement of capital stock 
and input services of Spanish banks. 
0712 JESÚS SAURINA AND CARLOS TRUCHARTE: An assessment of Basel II procyclicality in mortgage portfolios. 
0713 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA AND IGNACIO HERNANDO: The reaction by industry insiders to M&As in the European 
financial industry. 
0714 MARIO IZQUIERDO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND JUAN A. ROJAS: On the aggregate effects of immigration in Spain. 
0715 FABIO CANOVA AND LUCA SALA: Back to square one: identification issues in DSGE models. 
0716 FERNANDO NIETO: The determinants of household credit in Spain. 
0717 EVA ORTEGA, PABLO BURRIEL, JOSÉ LUIS FERNÁNDEZ, EVA FERRAZ AND SAMUEL HURTADO: 
Actualización del modelo trimestral del Banco de España. 
0718 JAVIER ANDRÉS AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Macroeconomic modelling in EMU: how relevant is the change in 
regime? 
                                                           
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue. 
0719 FABIO CANOVA, DAVID LÓPEZ-SALIDO AND CLAUDIO MICHELACCI: The labor market effects of technology 
shocks. 
0720 JUAN M. RUIZ AND JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA: The wise use of dummies in gravity models: Export potentials in 
the Euromed region. 
0721 CLAUDIA CANALS, XAVIER GABAIX, JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA AND DAVID WEINSTEIN: Trade patterns, trade 
balances and idiosyncratic shocks. 
0722 MARTÍN VALLCORBA AND JAVIER DELGADO: Determinantes de la morosidad bancaria en una economía 
dolarizada. El caso uruguayo. 
0723 ANTON NAKOV AND ANDREA PESCATORI: Inflation-output gap trade-off with a dominant oil supplier.  
0724 JUAN AYUSO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The effects of the introduction of tax incentives 
on retirement savings. 
0725 DONATO MASCIANDARO, MARÍA J. NIETO AND HENRIETTE PRAST: Financial governance of banking supervision. 
0726 LUIS GUTIÉRREZ DE ROZAS: Testing for competition in the Spanish banking industry: The Panzar-Rosse approach 
revisited. 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones
Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488
e-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
